Evidence map›Paper›PMID 23637427›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical ethics2013

Capacity, harm and experience in the life of persons as equals.

John Finnis

Abstract readComment
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical ethics, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
0.6field-weighted citation impact, top 21% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 3 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.

John FinnisUniversity of Oxford, University College,Oxford OX1 4BH, UK. john.finnis@univ.ox.ac.uk
University of Oxford · GB

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper identifies and contests the thesis it takes to be the central premise of Giubilini and Minerva, 'Why should the baby live?', namely that rights, subjecthood and personhood have as a necessary condition that the undergoing of a harm be experienced. That thesis entails the repugnant or absurd conclusion that we do not have the right not to be killed in our sleep. The conclusion can be avoided by adding some premise or qualification about actual capacities for experience of harm, but nothing in the Giubilini and Minerva article shows that such capacities do not exist, as actual and not merely potential, in the newly born human infant (and indeed in the unborn human child/foetus). The present paper reviews an earlier philosophical attempt to deploy an awareness criterion of personhood, and proposes objections to some other aspects of the article under consideration.

Indexed as

AdoptionFetal ViabilityMoral ObligationsPersonhoodValue of LifeAbortion, InducedBeginning of Human LifeHumansInfanticideAbortionCapacityInfanticidePersons

Identifiers

PMID23637427
OpenAlexW2096997898

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.