ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2013
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 73 papers.
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Who cites it
73 citing papers in PubMed.
- From simultaneous to leader-follower play in direct reciprocity.PNAS nexus · 2026Article
- Evolution of strategies in iterated games: a deep multi-agent reinforcement learning approach with hybrid genetic and CMA-ES optimization.Frontiers in artificial intelligence · 2026Article
- Reputation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Simple, Analytically Solvable Agents' Model.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Article
- Evolutionary dynamics of behavioral motivations for cooperation.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Repeated games with partner choice.PLoS computational biology · 2025Article
- Matrix games between full siblings in Mendelian populations.PloS one · 2025Article
- The distorting effects of producer strategies: Why engagement does not reveal consumer preferences for misinformation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.PloS one · 2024Article
- Resolving social dilemmas with minimal reward transfer.Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems · 2024Article
- A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023Article
- Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.PNAS nexus · 2023Article
- Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Misperception influence on zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints.Nature communications · 2022Article
13 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.
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3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called "zero-determinant" strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows "extortioners" to ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in coevolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called "Red King" effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.