ReviewViruses2012
The impact of regulations, safety considerations and physical limitations on research progress at maximum biocontainment.
Review in Viruses, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 16 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
16 citing papers in PubMed, 31 citations in OpenAlex.
- A Minimum Information about a High Containment Laboratory Experiment (MIHCLE) reporting standard.Nature methods · 2026Article
- Modeling the effects of routine screening for accidental lab-acquired infections on the risk of potential pandemic pathogen escape from high-biosafety research facilities.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Multi-platform omics analysis of Nipah virus infection reveals viral glycoprotein modulation of mitochondria.Cell reports · 2025Article
- Biodefence research two decades on: worth the investment?The Lancet. Infectious diseases · 2021Review
- Strategies for Validation of Inactivation of Viruses with Trizol® LS and Formalin Solutions.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2020Article
- Development and implementation of evidence-based laboratory safety management tools for a public health laboratory.Safety science · 2019Article
- Genetic stability of Rift Valley fever virus MP-12 vaccine during serial passages in culture cells.NPJ vaccines · 2017Article
- Article
- Safety Precautions and Operating Procedures in an (A)BSL-4 Laboratory: 2. General Practices.Journal of visualized experiments : JoVE · 2016Article
- Safety Precautions and Operating Procedures in an (A)BSL-4 Laboratory: 1. Biosafety Level 4 Suit Laboratory Suite Entry and Exit Procedures.Journal of visualized experiments : JoVE · 2016Article
- The L, M, and S Segments of Rift Valley Fever Virus MP-12 Vaccine Independently Contribute to a Temperature-Sensitive Phenotype.Journal of virology · 2016Article
- Rift Valley Fever Virus MP-12 Vaccine Is Fully Attenuated by a Combination of Partial Attenuations in the S, M, and L Segments.Journal of virology · 2015Article
- Optimized microRNA purification from TRIzol-treated plasma.BMC genomics · 2015Article
- ABSL-4 aerobiology biosafety and technology at the NIH/NIAID integrated research facility at Fort Detrick.Viruses · 2014Article
- Pathogen security-help or hindrance?Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2014Review
- Challenges and Practices in Building and Implementing Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs to Enable Basic and Translational Research with Select Agents.Journal of bioterrorism & biodefense · 2013Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
8 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
We describe herein, limitations on research at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment laboratories, with regard to biosecurity regulations, safety considerations, research space limitations, and physical constraints in executing experimental procedures. These limitations can severely impact the number of collaborations and size of research projects investigating microbial pathogens of biodefense concern. Acquisition, use, storage, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) are highly regulated due to their potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. All federal, state, city, and local regulations must be followed to obtain and maintain registration for the institution to conduct research involving BSAT. These include initial screening and continuous monitoring of personnel, controlled access to containment laboratories, accurate and current BSAT inventory records. Safety considerations are paramount in BSL-4 containment laboratories while considering the types of research tools, workflow and time required for conducting both in vivo and in vitro experiments in limited space. Required use of a positive-pressure encapsulating suit imposes tremendous physical limitations on the researcher. Successful mitigation of these constraints requires additional time, effort, good communication, and creative solutions. Test and evaluation of novel vaccines and therapeutics conducted under good laboratory practice (GLP) conditions for FDA approval are prioritized and frequently share the same physical space with important ongoing basic research studies. The possibilities and limitations of biomedical research involving microbial pathogens of biodefense concern in BSL-4 containment laboratories are explored in this review.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.