ArticleThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care2013
Soft budget constraints in health care: evidence from Italy.
Article in The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
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Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
- The smart senior care demand in China in the context of active ageing: a qualitative study with multiple perspectives.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
- Negative effects of high public debt on health systems facing pandemic crisis: Lessons from COVID-19 in Europe to prepare for future emergencies.AIMS public health · 2024Article
- Devolution and grant-in-aid design for the provision of impure public goods.SpringerPlus · 2016Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
The reforms that have reshaped the public health care systems have often been coupled with devolution. However, this process has frequently been accompanied by widespread soft budget constraint policies. In this paper we argue that the soft budget constraint arises from a cooperative game between local authorities that force Central Government to bail them out. Our theoretical model is tested using data for Italian regions for the period 2002-2006 and our hypothesis is verified. Although the model uses Italy as a benchmark, we believe that the framework we propose could be extended to other federal contexts where resources are distributed unevenly and preferences are asymmetric.
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