Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22847304›Full record

ArticleJournal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA

A practical approach to achieve private medical record linkage in light of public resources.

Mehmet Kuzu, Murat Kantarcioglu, Elizabeth Ashley Durham, Csaba Toth, Bradley Malin

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Design and implementation of a privacy preserving electronic health record linkage tool in Chicago.Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA · 2015
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Composite Bloom Filters for Secure Record Linkage.IEEE transactions on knowledge and data engineering · 2014
    Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Privacy preserving interactive record linkage (PPIRL).Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Mehmet KuzuDepartment of Computer Science, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas, USA.
Murat Kantarcioglu
Elizabeth Ashley Durham
Csaba Toth
Bradley Malin

Funding

Vanderbilt Genome Electronic Records ProjectU01HG006378 · NHGRI · VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY · PI RODEN, DAN M · 2011 to 2014
$4.0M
Technologies to Enable Privacy in Biomedical DatabanksR01LM009989 · NLM · VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER · PI MALIN, BRADLEY A. · 2009 to 2014
$1.6M
NHGRI NIH HHS U01 HG006378NLM NIH HHS R01 LM009989NLM NIH HHS R01LM009989
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveIntegration of patients' records across resources enhances analytics. To address privacy concerns, emerging strategies such as Bloom filter encodings (BFEs), enable integration while obscuring identifiers. However, recent investigations demonstrate BFEs are, in theory, vulnerable to cryptanalysis when encoded identifiers are randomly selected from a public resource. This study investigates the extent to which cryptanalysis conditions hold for (1) real patient records and (2) a countermeasure that obscures the frequencies of the identifying values in encoded datasets.

designFirst, to investigate the strength of cryptanalysis for real patient records, we build BFEs from identifiers in an electronic medical record system and apply cryptanalysis using identifiers in a publicly available voter registry. Second, to investigate the countermeasure under ideal cryptanalysis conditions, we compose BFEs from the identifiers that are randomly selected from a public voter registry. MEASUREMENT: We utilize precision (ie, rate of correct re-identified encodings) and computation efficiency (ie, time to complete cryptanalysis) to assess the performance of cryptanalysis in BFEs before and after application of the countermeasure.

resultsCryptanalysis can achieve high precision when the encoded identifiers are composed of a random sample of a public resource (ie, a voter registry). However, we also find that the attack is less efficient and may not be practical for more realistic scenarios. By contrast, the proposed countermeasure made cryptanalysis impractical in terms of precision and efficiency.

conclusionsPerformance of cryptanalysis against BFEs based on patient data is significantly lower than theoretical estimates. The proposed countermeasure makes BFEs resistant to known practical attacks.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityConfidentialityMedical Record LinkageElectronic Health RecordsHumansUnited States

Identifiers

PMID22847304
PMCPMC3638181

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.