Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22745606›Full record

ArticlePLoS medicine2012

Tobacco industry manipulation of tobacco excise and tobacco advertising policies in the Czech Republic: an analysis of tobacco industry documents.

Risako Shirane, Katherine Smith, Hana Ross, Karin E Silver, Simon Williams, Anna Gilmore

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS medicine, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
2.9field-weighted citation impact, top 9% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 37 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Article
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  15. Term limits and the tobacco industry.Social science & medicine (1982) · 2014
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.

Risako ShiraneDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom. shirane@med.kobe-u.ac.jp
Katherine Smith
Hana Ross
Karin E Silver
Simon Williams
Anna Gilmore
University of Bath · GBAmerican Cancer Society · USUniversity of Edinburgh · GB

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Global Governance and Public HealthR01CA160695 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF BATH · PI GILMORE, ANNA B · 2011 to 2013
$1.3M
British Heart FoundationCancer Research UKDepartment of HealthMedical Research Council PTA-037-27-0181NCI NIH HHS R01 CA160695NCI NIH HHS R01CA160695
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs') efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important aspect of TTC competitiveness. METHODS AND

findingsTTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored, overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence policy.

conclusionThere is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We conclude that this helps explain the country's weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in reducing smoking.

Indexed as

DocumentationAdvertisingCommerceCzech RepublicEuropean UnionHumansIncomeInterviews as TopicPublic PolicySocial Control, FormalTaxesTobacco Industry

Identifiers

PMID22745606
PMCPMC3383744
OpenAlexW2106092493

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.