Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22511209›Full record

ArticleBMJ (Clinical research ed.)2012

Exempting dissenting patients from pay for performance schemes: retrospective analysis of exception reporting in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework.

Tim Doran, Evangelos Kontopantelis, Catherine Fullwood, Helen Lester, Jose M Valderas, Stephen Campbell

Abstract readEvaluation Study
In one paragraph

Article in BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
25citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

25 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Design and effects of outcome-based payment models in healthcare: a systematic review.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2019
    Pooled it
  2. Observational
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Healthcare Equity and Commissioning: A Four-Year National Analysis of Portuguese Primary Healthcare Units.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Article
  7. Deprivation and primary care funding in Greater Manchester after devolution: a cross-sectional analysis.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2019
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. How a universal health system reduces inequalities: lessons from England.Journal of epidemiology and community health · 2016
    Article
  14. Improving the Quality of Quality Measurement.Journal of general internal medicine · 2016
    Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Tim DoranHealth Sciences Research Group-Primary Care, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. doran@manchester.ac.uk
Evangelos Kontopantelis
Catherine Fullwood
Helen Lester
Jose M Valderas
Stephen Campbell

Funding

Department of Health CDF-2011-04-016Department of Health NIHR/CS/010/024Medical Research Council MC_PC_13042Medical Research Council MR/K006665/1
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo examine the reasons why practices exempt patients from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme (exception reporting) and to identify the characteristics of general practices associated with informed dissent.

designRetrospective analysis.

settingData for 2008-9 extracted from the clinical computing systems of general practices in England.

participants8229 English family practices.

main outcome measuresRates of exception reporting for 37 clinical quality indicators, associations of patient and general practice factors with exception rates, and financial gain for practices relating to their use of exception reporting.

resultsThe median rate of exception reporting was 2.7% (interquartile range 1.9-3.9%) overall and 0.44% (0.14-1.1%) for informed dissent, but variation in rates was wide between practices and across indicators. Common reasons for exception reporting were logistical (40.6% of exceptions), clinical contraindication (18.7%), and patient informed dissent (30.1%). Higher rates of informed dissent were associated with: higher numbers of registered patients, higher levels of local area deprivation, and failure of the practice to secure maximum remuneration in the previous year. Exception reporting increased the cost of the scheme by £30,844,500 (€36,877,700; $49,053,200) (£0.58 per patient), with two indicators accounting for a quarter of this additional cost.

conclusionsThe provision to exception report enables practices to exempt dissenting patients without being financially penalised. Relatively few patients were excluded for informed dissent, however, suggesting that the incentivised activities were broadly acceptable to patients.

Indexed as

EnglandFamily PracticeGeneral PracticeHumansInformed ConsentLinear ModelsMultivariate AnalysisOutcome Assessment, Health CarePatient Acceptance of Health CareQuality Indicators, Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveRetrospective Studies

Identifiers

PMID22511209
PMCPMC3328418

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.