Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22456866›Full record

ArticleDiabetes care2012

The relationship between financial incentives and quality of diabetes care in Ontario, Canada.

Tara Kiran, J Charles Victor, Alexander Kopp, Baiju R Shah, Richard H Glazier

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Diabetes care, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 32 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
32citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

32 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Trial
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Primary care services and emergency department visits in blended fee-for-service and blended capitation models: evidence from Ontario, Canada.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Observational
  14. Article
  15. Review
  16. Article
  17. The impact of the diabetes management incentive on diabetes-related services: evidence from Ontario, Canada.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2020
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Tara KiranCentre for Research on Inner City Health, Keenan Research Centre in the Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute of St. Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. tara.kiran@utoronto.ca
J Charles Victor
Alexander Kopp
Baiju R Shah
Richard H Glazier

Funding

Canadian Institutes of Health Research
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveWe assessed the impact of a diabetes incentive code introduced for primary care physicians in Ontario, Canada, in 2002 on quality of diabetes care at the population and patient level. RESEARCH DESIGN AND

methodsWe analyzed administrative data for 757,928 Ontarians with diabetes to examine the use of the code and receipt of three evidence-based monitoring tests from 2006 to 2008. We assessed testing rates over time and before and after billing of the incentive code.

resultsOne-quarter of Ontarians with diabetes had an incentive code billed by their physician. The proportion receiving the optimal number of all three monitoring tests (HbA(1c), cholesterol, and eye tests) rose gradually from 16% in 2000 to 27% in 2008. Individuals who were younger, lived in rural areas, were not enrolled in a primary care model, or had a mental illness were less likely to receive all three recommended tests. Patients with higher numbers of incentive code billings in 2006-2008 were more likely to receive recommended testing but also were more likely to have received the highest level of recommended testing prior to introduction of the incentive code. Following the same patients over time, improvement in recommended testing was no greater after billing of the first incentive code than before.

conclusionsThe diabetes incentive code led to minimal improvement in quality of diabetes care at the population and patient level. Our findings suggest that physicians who provide the highest quality care prior to incentives may be those most likely to claim incentive payments.

Indexed as

Diabetes MellitusAdultAgedAged, 80 and overCanadaFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedOntarioPhysician Incentive PlansQuality of Health Care

Identifiers

PMID22456866
PMCPMC3329816

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.