Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22417137›Full record

ArticleHealth services research2012

The effect of Phase 2 of the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration on incentive payments to hospitals caring for disadvantaged patients.

Andrew M Ryan, Jan Blustein, Tim Doran, Marilyn D Michelow, Lawrence P Casalino

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health services research, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pay for performance for hospitals.The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · 2019
    Pooled it
  2. Design and effects of outcome-based payment models in healthcare: a systematic review.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2019
    Pooled it
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Pay-for-Performance: Disappointing Results or Masked Heterogeneity?Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2017
    Review
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Andrew M RyanRobert F. Wagner Graduate School and Division of General Medicine, NYU Medical School, New York, NY 10065, USA. Amr2015@med.cornell.edu
Jan Blustein
Tim Doran
Marilyn D Michelow
Lawrence P Casalino

Funding

Estimating Hospital Outcome Quality: Applications to Pay-for-PerformanceK01HS018546 · AHRQ · WEILL MEDICAL COLL OF CORNELL UNIV · PI RYAN, ANDREW M · 2010 to 2014
$742k
AHRQ HHS 1 K01 HS018546-01A1AHRQ HHS K01 HS018546Department of Health CDF-2011-04-016
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveThe Medicare and Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a hospital-based pay-for-performance program, changed its incentive design from one rewarding only high performance (Phase 1) to another rewarding high performance, moderate performance, and improvement (Phase 2). We tested whether this design change reduced the gap in incentive payments among hospitals treating patients across the gradient of socioeconomic disadvantage. DATA: To estimate incentive payments in both phases, we used data from the Premier Inc. website and from Medicare Provider Analysis and Review files. We used data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Impact File to identify hospital characteristics. STUDY

designHospitals were divided into quartiles based on their Disproportionate Share Index (DSH), from lowest disadvantage (Quartile 1) to highest disadvantage (Quartile 4). In both phases of the HQID, we tested for differences across the DSH quartiles for three outcomes: (1) receipt of any incentive payments; (2) total incentive payments; and (3) incentive payments per discharge. For each of the study outcomes, we performed a hospital-level difference-in-differences analysis to test whether the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles decreased from Phase 1 to Phase 2. PRINCIPAL

findingsIn Phase 1, there were significant gaps across the DSH quartiles for the receipt of any payment and for payment per discharge. In Phase 2, the gap was not significant for the receipt of any payment, but it remained significant for payment per discharge. For the receipt of any incentive payment, difference-in-difference estimates showed significant reductions in the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, 17.5 percentage points [p < .05]; Quartile 3, 18.1 percentage points [p < .01]; Quartile 4, 28.3 percentage points [p < .01]). For payments per discharge, the gap was also significantly reduced between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, $14.92 per discharge [p < .10]; Quartile 3, $17.34 per discharge [p < .05]; Quartile 4, $21.31 per discharge [p < .01]). There were no significant reductions in the gap for total payments.

conclusionsThe design change in the HQID reduced the disparity in the receipt of any incentive payment and for incentive payments per discharge between hospitals caring for the most and least socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations.

Indexed as

Economics, HospitalHealth Services ResearchHumansMedicaidMedicareModels, EconomicQuality ImprovementQuality of Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveUnited States

Identifiers

PMID22417137
PMCPMC3401392

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.