ArticlemBio2012
Biosafety considerations of mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza.
Article in mBio, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed.
- Use of bacteriophage particles displaying influenza virus hemagglutinin for the detection of hemagglutination-inhibition antibodies.Journal of virological methods · 2014Article
- Engaging the normative question in the H5N1 avian influenza mutation experiments.Philosophy, ethics, and humanities in medicine : PEHM · 2013Article
- Challenges and Practices in Building and Implementing Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs to Enable Basic and Translational Research with Select Agents.Journal of bioterrorism & biodefense · 2013Article
- Potential strategies and biosafety protocols used for dual-use research on highly pathogenic influenza viruses.Reviews in medical virology · 2012Review
- Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The ability to produce an H5N1 influenza virus that can be transmitted from human to human raises both biosecurity and biosafety concerns. After analyzing the biosafety risks of such a virus, we propose that it be handled at biosafety level 4 (BSL4) containment until and unless it becomes clear that the risks to humans and other mammals can be mitigated.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.