Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22164229›Full record

ArticlePloS one2011

A systematic review of re-identification attacks on health data.

Khaled El Emam, Elizabeth Jonker, Luk Arbuckle, Bradley Malin

Erratum issuedAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2011. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 156 papers, 7 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
156citing papers in PubMed, 7 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

156 citing papers in PubMed, 7 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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96 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Khaled El EmamElectronic Health Information Laboratory, CHEO Research Institute, Ottawa, Canada. kelemam@uottawa.ca
Elizabeth Jonker
Luk Arbuckle
Bradley Malin

Funding

Technologies to Enable Privacy in Biomedical DatabanksR01LM009989 · NLM · VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER · PI MALIN, BRADLEY A. · 2009 to 2014
$1.6M
NHGRI NIH HHS U01HG00460301NLM NIH HHS R01 LM009989NLM NIH HHS R01LM009989
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPrivacy legislation in most jurisdictions allows the disclosure of health data for secondary purposes without patient consent if it is de-identified. Some recent articles in the medical, legal, and computer science literature have argued that de-identification methods do not provide sufficient protection because they are easy to reverse. Should this be the case, it would have significant and important implications on how health information is disclosed, including: (a) potentially limiting its availability for secondary purposes such as research, and (b) resulting in more identifiable health information being disclosed. Our objectives in this systematic review were to: (a) characterize known re-identification attacks on health data and contrast that to re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the overall proportion of records that have been correctly re-identified in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate weaknesses in current de-identification methods. METHODS AND

findingsSearches were conducted in IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and PubMed. After screening, fourteen eligible articles representing distinct attacks were identified. On average, approximately a quarter of the records were re-identified across all studies (0.26 with 95% CI 0.046-0.478) and 0.34 for attacks on health data (95% CI 0-0.744). There was considerable uncertainty around the proportions as evidenced by the wide confidence intervals, and the mean proportion of records re-identified was sensitive to unpublished studies. Two of fourteen attacks were performed with data that was de-identified using existing standards. Only one of these attacks was on health data, which resulted in a success rate of 0.00013.

conclusionsThe current evidence shows a high re-identification rate but is dominated by small-scale studies on data that was not de-identified according to existing standards. This evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions about the efficacy of de-identification methods.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityPrivacyConfidentialityDatabases, FactualHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability ActHumansMedical Records Systems, ComputerizedModels, StatisticalReproducibility of ResultsSoftwareUnited States

Identifiers

PMID22164229
PMCPMC3229505

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.