Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22144881›Full record

ReviewPLoS computational biology2011

Genomics and privacy: implications of the new reality of closed data for the field.

Dov Greenbaum, Andrea Sboner, Xinmeng Jasmine Mu, Mark Gerstein

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in PLoS computational biology, 2011. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 33 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
33citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

33 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. AI applications in functional genomics.Computational and structural biotechnology journal · 2021
    Review
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Data sharing for clinical utility.Cold Spring Harbor molecular case studies · 2019
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Review
  12. Article
  13. Real-time Protection of Genomic Data Sharing in Beacon Services.AMIA Joint Summits on Translational Science proceedings. AMIA Joint Summits on Translational Science · 2018
    Article
  14. Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks.Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA · 2017
    Article
  15. An overview of human genetic privacy.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · 2017
    Review
  16. Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Review
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Dov GreenbaumProgram in Computational Biology and Bioinformatics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA.
Andrea Sboner
Xinmeng Jasmine Mu
Mark Gerstein

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Open source and open data have been driving forces in bioinformatics in the past. However, privacy concerns may soon change the landscape, limiting future access to important data sets, including personal genomics data. Here we survey this situation in some detail, describing, in particular, how the large scale of the data from personal genomic sequencing makes it especially hard to share data, exacerbating the privacy problem. We also go over various aspects of genomic privacy: first, there is basic identifiability of subjects having their genome sequenced. However, even for individuals who have consented to be identified, there is the prospect of very detailed future characterization of their genotype, which, unanticipated at the time of their consent, may be more personal and invasive than the release of their medical records. We go over various computational strategies for dealing with the issue of genomic privacy. One can "slice" and reformat datasets to allow them to be partially shared while securing the most private variants. This is particularly applicable to functional genomics information, which can be largely processed without variant information. For handling the most private data there are a number of legal and technological approaches-for example, modifying the informed consent procedure to acknowledge that privacy cannot be guaranteed, and/or employing a secure cloud computing environment. Cloud computing in particular may allow access to the data in a more controlled fashion than the current practice of downloading and computing on large datasets. Furthermore, it may be particularly advantageous for small labs, given that the burden of many privacy issues falls disproportionately on them in comparison to large corporations and genome centers. Finally, we discuss how education of future genetics researchers will be important, with curriculums emphasizing privacy and data security. However, teaching personal genomics with identifiable subjects in the university setting will, in turn, create additional privacy issues and social conundrums.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityGenetic PrivacyGenomicsHumans

Identifiers

PMID22144881
PMCPMC3228779

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.