ArticlePloS one2011
Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.
Article in PloS one, 2011. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.
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Who cites it
10 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evolutionary path from a prisoner's dilemma to a harmony game via hawk-dove games.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Cooperation and Lateral Forces: Moving Beyond Bottom-Up and Top-Down Drivers of Animal Population Dynamics.Frontiers in psychology · 2022Article
- Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics.Theory in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften · 2018Article
- Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2017Article
- Interaction between Allee effects caused by organism-environment feedback and by other ecological mechanisms.PloS one · 2017Article
- Defectors Can Create Conditions That Rescue Cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2015Article
- Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2014Article
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics of complex social strategies in microbial communities.Communicative & integrative biology · 2014Review
- Range expansion promotes cooperation in an experimental microbial metapopulation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2013Article
- feedback between population and evolutionary dynamics determines the fate of social microbial populations.PLoS biology · 2013Article
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
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Abstract
Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
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