Evidence map›Paper›PMID 22108239›Full record

ArticleJournal of theoretical biology2012

A game dynamic model for vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers: measles as an example.

Eunha Shim, John J Grefenstette, Steven M Albert, Brigid E Cakouros, Donald S Burke

Open access · greenAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of theoretical biology, 2012. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
25citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
5.3field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

25 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 91 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
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  9. Persistence of anti-vaccine sentiment in social networks through strategic interactions.Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2021
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  19. Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis.Computational and mathematical methods in medicine · 2014
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Eunha ShimDepartment of Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15261, USA. eshim@pitt.edu
John J Grefenstette
Steven M Albert
Brigid E Cakouros
Donald S Burke
University of Pittsburgh · US

Funding

Training, Outreach & Diversity ComponentU54GM088491 · NIGMS · UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH AT PITTSBURGH · PI ROBERTS, MARK STENIUS · 2009 to 2018
$16.7M
NIGMS NIH HHS 5U54GM088491-02NIGMS NIH HHS U54 GM088491
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Widespread avoidance of Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccination (MMR), with a consequent increase in the incidence of major measles outbreaks, demonstrates that the effectiveness of vaccination programs can be thwarted by the public misperceptions of vaccine risk. By coupling game theory and epidemic models, we examine vaccination choice among populations stratified into two behavioral groups: vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers. The two behavioral groups are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their perceptions of vaccine and infection risks. We demonstrate that the pursuit of self-interest among vaccine skeptics often leads to vaccination levels that are suboptimal for a population, even if complete coverage is achieved among vaccine believers. The demand for measles vaccine across populations driven by individual self-interest was found to be more sensitive to the proportion of vaccine skeptics than to the extent to which vaccine skeptics misperceive the risk of vaccine. Furthermore, as the number of vaccine skeptics increases, the probability of infection among vaccine skeptics increases initially, but it decreases once the vaccine skeptics begin receiving the vaccination, if both behavioral groups are vaccinated according to individual self-interest. Our results show that the discrepancy between the coverages of measles vaccine that are driven by self-interest and those driven by population interest becomes larger when the cost of vaccination increases. This research illustrates the importance of public education on vaccine safety and infection risk in order to maintain vaccination levels that are sufficient to maintain herd immunity.

Indexed as

Attitude to HealthMeasles-Mumps-Rubella VaccineModels, BiologicalChoice BehaviorGame TheoryHealth Care CostsHumansImmunization ProgramsMeaslesRefusal to ParticipateVaccinationMeasles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccine

Identifiers

PMID22108239
PMCPMC3709470
OpenAlexW1998709934

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceTDM
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.