ArticlePloS one2011
Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
Article in PloS one, 2011. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.
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Who cites it
7 citing papers in PubMed.
- Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Dynamics of social network emergence explain network evolution.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with probabilistic abstention.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations.PloS one · 2016Article
- Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: fixation probabilities under weak selection.PloS one · 2013Article
- Article
- Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game.Scientific reports · 2012Article
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Authors and funding
5 authors.
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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
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