Evidence map›Paper›PMID 21139709›Full record

ArticleCognitive neurodynamics2010

On the reciprocal interaction between believing and feeling: an adaptive agent modelling perspective.

Zulfiqar A Memon, Jan Treur

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Cognitive neurodynamics, 2010. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Confronting, Representing, and Believing Counterintuitive Concepts: Navigating the Natural and the Supernatural.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2014
    Article
  2. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Zulfiqar A Memon
Jan Treur

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

An agent's beliefs usually depend on informational or cognitive factors such as observation or received communication or reasoning, but also affective factors may play a role. In this paper, by adopting neurological theories on the role of emotions and feelings, an agent model is introduced incorporating the interaction between cognitive and affective factors in believing. The model describes how the strength of a belief may not only depend on information obtained, but also on the emotional responses on the belief. For feeling emotions a recursive body loop between preparations for emotional responses and feelings is assumed. The model introduces a second feedback loop for the interaction between feeling and belief. The strength of a belief and of the feeling both result from the converging dynamic pattern modelled by the combination of the two loops. For some specific cases it is described, for example, how for certain personal characteristics an optimistic world view is generated in the agent's beliefs, or, for other characteristics, a pessimistic world view. Moreover, the paper shows how such affective effects on beliefs can emerge and become stronger over time due to experiences obtained. It is shown how based on Hebbian learning a connection from feeling to belief can develop. As these connections affect the strenghts of future beliefs, in this way an effect of judgment 'by experience built up in the past' or 'by gut feeling' can be obtained. Some example simulation results and a mathematical analysis of the equilibria are presented.

Indexed as

Agent modelBelievingFeelingHebbian learning

Identifiers

PMID21139709
PMCPMC2974093

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.