Evidence map›Paper›PMID 21029088›Full record

ArticleHealth services research2011

Do hospitals alter patient care effort allocations under pay-for-performance?

Lauren Hersch Nicholas, Justin B Dimick, Theodore J Iwashyna

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health services research, 2011. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Design and effects of outcome-based payment models in healthcare: a systematic review.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2019
    Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Pay-for-Performance: Disappointing Results or Masked Heterogeneity?Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2017
    Review
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Nursing-sensitive indicators: a concept analysis.Journal of advanced nursing · 2014
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Lauren Hersch NicholasInstitute for Social Research and Center for Healthcare Outcomes and Policy, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, USA. lnichola@umich.edu
Justin B Dimick
Theodore J Iwashyna

Funding

TRAINING IN THE DEMOGRAPHY OF AGINGT32AG000221 · NIA · UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR · PI Sarah A. Burgard · 1992 to 2026
$15.3M
Population Studies Center Infrastructure GrantR24HD041028 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR · PI SMOCK, PAMELA J. · 2001 to 2016
$13.2M
The structure and outcomes of critical care transfer networkK08HL091249 · NHLBI · UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR · PI IWASHYNA, THEODORE J · 2008 to 2012
$661k
Composite Measures of Surgical PerformanceK08HS017765 · AHRQ · UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR · PI DIMICK, JUSTIN BRIGHAM · 2008 to 2011
$621k
AHRQ HHS 5K08HS017765-02AHRQ HHS K08 HS017765NHLBI NIH HHS K08 HL091249NHLBI NIH HHS K08HL091249NIA NIH HHS T32 AG000221NICHD NIH HHS R24 HD041028
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo determine whether hospitals increase efforts on easy tasks relative to difficult tasks to improve scores under pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives. DATA SOURCE: The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare data from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005 and 2003 American Hospital Association Annual Survey data. STUDY

designWe classified measures of process compliance targeted by the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration as easy or difficult to improve based on whether they introduce additional per-patient costs. We compared process compliance on easy and difficult tasks at hospitals eligible for P4P bonus payments relative to hospitals engaged in public reporting using random effects regression models. PRINCIPAL

findingsP4P hospitals did not preferentially increase efforts for easy tasks in patients with heart failure or pneumonia, but they did exhibit modestly greater effort on easy tasks for heart attack admissions. There is no systematic evidence that effort was allocated toward easier processes of care and away from more difficult tasks.

conclusionsDespite perverse P4P incentives to change allocation of efforts across tasks to maximize performance scores at lowest cost, we find little evidence that hospitals respond to P4P incentives as hypothesized. Alternative incentive structures may motivate greater response by targeted hospitals.

Indexed as

Process Assessment, Health CareCenters for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.Guideline AdherenceHealth Care RationingHealth Services ResearchHeart FailureHospital AdministrationHumansMyocardial InfarctionPneumoniaPractice Guidelines as TopicQuality of Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveUnited States

Identifiers

PMID21029088
PMCPMC3034262

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.