Evidence map›Paper›PMID 20084098›Full record

ArticlePLoS medicine2010

"Working the system"--British American tobacco's influence on the European union treaty and its implications for policy: an analysis of internal tobacco industry documents.

Katherine E Smith, Gary Fooks, Jeff Collin, Heide Weishaar, Sema Mandal, Anna B Gilmore

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS medicine, 2010. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 39 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
39citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
49.7field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

39 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 108 citations in OpenAlex.

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  17. Tobacco and electronic nicotine delivery systems regulation.Translational lung cancer research · 2019
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Katherine E SmithSchool for Health, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom. K.Smith@bath.ac.uk
Gary Fooks
Jeff Collin
Heide Weishaar
Sema Mandal
Anna B Gilmore
University of Bath · GBUniversity of Edinburgh · GBLondon School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine · GB

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Public Policy and Global HealthR01CA091021 · NCI · U OF L LONDON SCH/HYGIENE &TROPICAL MED · PI LEE, KELLEY · 2001 to 2018
$5.1M
NCI NIH HHS 2 R01 CA091021-05NCI NIH HHS R01 CA091021
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundImpact assessment (IA) of all major European Union (EU) policies is now mandatory. The form of IA used has been criticised for favouring corporate interests by overemphasising economic impacts and failing to adequately assess health impacts. Our study sought to assess how, why, and in what ways corporations, and particularly the tobacco industry, influenced the EU's approach to IA. METHODS AND

findingsIn order to identify whether industry played a role in promoting this system of IA within the EU, we analysed internal documents from British American Tobacco (BAT) that were disclosed following a series of litigation cases in the United States. We combined this analysis with one of related literature and interviews with key informants. Our analysis demonstrates that from 1995 onwards BAT actively worked with other corporate actors to successfully promote a business-oriented form of IA that favoured large corporations. It appears that BAT favoured this form of IA because it could advance the company's European interests by establishing ground rules for policymaking that would: (i) provide an economic framework for evaluating all policy decisions, implicitly prioritising costs to businesses; (ii) secure early corporate involvement in policy discussions; (iii) bestow the corporate sector with a long-term advantage over other actors by increasing policymakers' dependence on information they supplied; and (iv) provide businesses with a persuasive means of challenging potential and existing legislation. The data reveal that an ensuing lobbying campaign, largely driven by BAT, helped secure binding changes to the EU Treaty via the Treaty of Amsterdam that required EU policymakers to minimise legislative burdens on businesses. Efforts subsequently focused on ensuring that these Treaty changes were translated into the application of a business orientated form of IA (cost-benefit analysis [CBA]) within EU policymaking procedures. Both the tobacco and chemical industries have since employed IA in apparent attempts to undermine key aspects of European policies designed to protect public health.

conclusionsOur findings suggest that BAT and its corporate allies have fundamentally altered the way in which all EU policy is made by making a business-oriented form of IA mandatory. This increases the likelihood that the EU will produce policies that advance the interests of major corporations, including those that produce products damaging to health, rather than in the interests of its citizens. Given that the public health community, focusing on health IA, has largely welcomed the increasing policy interest in IA, this suggests that urgent consideration is required of the ways in which IA can be employed to undermine, as well as support, effective public health policies.

Indexed as

Conflict of InterestEuropean UnionGovernment RegulationPolicy MakingCommerceCost-Benefit AnalysisHealth PolicyHumansLobbyingPersuasive CommunicationRisk AssessmentSmokingSmoking CessationTobacco Industry

Identifiers

PMID20084098
PMCPMC2797088
OpenAlexW1974609334

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.