Evidence map›Paper›PMID 19826881›Full record

ArticleJournal of general internal medicine2009

The effect of performance-based financial incentives on improving patient care experiences: a statewide evaluation.

Hector P Rodriguez, Ted von Glahn, Marc N Elliott, William H Rogers, Dana Gelb Safran

Abstract readComparative StudyEvaluation Study
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of general internal medicine, 2009. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 26 papers, 4 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
26citing papers in PubMed, 4 pooled it
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

26 citing papers in PubMed, 4 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Hector P RodriguezDepartment of Health Services, School of Public Health, University of California, Box 951772, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1772, USA. hrod@ucla.edu
Ted von Glahn
Marc N Elliott
William H Rogers
Dana Gelb Safran

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPatient experience measures are central to many pay-for-performance (P4P) programs nationally, but the effect of performance-based financial incentives on improving patient care experiences has not been assessed.

methodsThe study uses Clinician & Group CAHPS data from commercially insured adult patients (n = 124,021) who had visits with 1,444 primary care physicians from 25 California medical groups between 2003 and 2006. Medical directors were interviewed to assess the magnitude and nature of financial incentives directed at individual physicians and the patient experience improvement activities adopted by groups. Multilevel regression models were used to assess the relationship between performance change on patient care experience measures and medical group characteristics, financial incentives, and performance improvement activities.

resultsOver the course of the study period, physicians improved performance on the physician-patient communication (0.62 point annual increase, p < 0.001), care coordination (0.48 point annual increase, p < 0.001), and office staff interaction (0.22 point annual increase, p = 0.02) measures. Physicians with lower baseline performance on patient experience measures experienced larger improvements (p < 0.001). Greater emphasis on clinical quality and patient experience criteria in individual physician incentive formulas was associated with larger improvements on the care coordination (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.01) measures. By contrast, greater emphasis on productivity and efficiency criteria was associated with declines in performance on the physician communication (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.001) composites.

conclusionsIn the context of statewide measurement, reporting, and performance-based financial incentives, patient care experiences significantly improved. In order to promote patient-centered care in pay for performance and public reporting programs, the mechanisms by which program features influence performance improvement should be clarified.

Indexed as

CaliforniaData CollectionHumansPatient CarePhysician Incentive PlansPrimary Health CareReimbursement, Incentive

Identifiers

PMID19826881
PMCPMC2787940

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.