ArticlePharmacoEconomics2009
Economic evaluation and cost-effectiveness thresholds: signals to firms and implications for R & D investment and innovation.
Article in PharmacoEconomics, 2009. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- A Framework for Considering the Role of the Public Sector in R&D of Health Technology.Pharmaceutical medicine · 2025Review
- Timely, Cheap, or Risk-Free? The Effect of Regulation on the Price and Availability of New Drugs.Pharmacy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Article
- The future of cystic fibrosis care: a global perspective.The Lancet. Respiratory medicine · 2020Review
- Comparative effectiveness regulations and pharmaceutical innovation.PharmacoEconomics · 2010Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
In this article we describe how reimbursement cost-effectiveness thresholds, per unit of health benefit, whether set explicitly or observed implicitly via historical reimbursement decisions, serve as a signal to firms about the commercial viability of their R&D projects (including candidate products for in-licensing). Traditional finance methods for R&D project valuations, such as net present value analyses (NPV), incorporate information from these payer reimbursement signals to help determine which R&D projects should be continued and which should be terminated (in the case of the latter because they yield an NPV < 0). Because the influence these signals have for firm R&D investment decisions is so significant, we argue that it is important for reimbursement thresholds to reflect the economic value of the unit of health benefit being considered for reimbursement. Thresholds set too low (below the economic value of the health benefit) will result in R&D investment levels that are too low relative to the economic value of R&D (on the margin). Similarly, thresholds set too high (above the economic value of the health benefit) will result in inefficiently high levels of R&D spending. The US in particular, which represents approximately half of the global pharmaceutical market (based on sales), and which seems poised to begin undertaking cost effectiveness in a systematic way, needs to exert caution in setting policies that explicitly or implicitly establish cost-effectiveness reimbursement thresholds for healthcare products and technologies, such as pharmaceuticals.
Indexed as
Identifiers
19803536What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.