Evidence map›Paper›PMID 19305777›Full record

ArticleHealthcare policy = Politiques de sante2007

Private health insurance in Germany: consequences of a dual system.

Stefan Greß

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Healthcare policy = Politiques de sante, 2007. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Stefan GreßAssociate Professor, Health Services Research and Health Economics, Department of Health Sciences, University of Applied Sciences Fulda, Fulda, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

A variety of financial and non-financial incentives has resulted in a considerable degree of adverse selection against social health insurance in Germany. Enrollees in private health insurance are healthier, have higher incomes and have fewer dependents than enrollees in social health insurance. Adverse selection decreases average premium income and at the same time increases average healthcare expenditures in social health insurance. As a consequence, financial sustainability of the public system declines. Moreover, financial incentives for healthcare providers have led to preferential treatment for privately insured patients in outpatient care. The dual health insurance system in Germany is therefore inequitable as well as inefficient, and cannot be considered a role model for post-Chaoulli Canada.

Identifiers

PMID19305777
PMCPMC2645182

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.