Evidence map›Paper›PMID 18559086›Full record

ArticleBMC health services research2008

"Mind the gap!" Evaluation of the performance gap attributable to exception reporting and target thresholds in the new GMS contract: National database analysis.

Robert Fleetcroft, Nicholas Steel, Richard Cookson, Amanda Howe

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC health services research, 2008. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
3.9field-weighted citation impact, top 8% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 16 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Robert FleetcroftPrimary Care Group, School of Medicine Health Policy and Practice, University of East Anglia Norwich, UK. r.fleetcroft@uea.ac.uk
Nicholas Steel
Richard Cookson
Amanda Howe
University of East Anglia · GBUniversity of York · GB

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe 2003 revision of the UK GMS contract rewards general practices for performance against clinical quality indicators. Practices can exempt patients from treatment, and can receive maximum payment for less than full coverage of eligible patients. This paper aims to estimate the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care (the pay-performance gap), and to estimate how much of the gap is attributable respectively to thresholds and to exception reporting.

methodsAnalysis of Quality Outcomes Framework data in the National Primary Care Database and exception reporting data from the Information Centre from 8407 practices in England in 2005 - 6. The main outcome measures were the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care at the practice level, both for individual indicators and a combined composite score. An additional outcome was the percentage of that gap attributable respectively to exception reporting and maximum threshold targets set at less than 100%.

resultsThe mean pay-performance gap for the 65 aggregated clinical indicators was 13.3% (range 2.9% to 48%). 52% of this gap (6.9% of eligible patients) is attributable to thresholds being set at less than 100%, and 48% to patients being exception reported. The gap was greater than 25% in 9 indicators: beta blockers and cholesterol control in heart disease; cholesterol control in stroke; influenza immunization in asthma; blood pressure, sugar and cholesterol control in diabetes; seizures in epilepsy and treatment of hypertension.

conclusionThreshold targets and exception reporting introduce an incentive ceiling, which substantially reduces the percentage of eligible patients that UK practices need to treat in order to receive maximum incentive payments for delivering that care. There are good clinical reasons for exception reporting, but after unsuitable patients have been exempted from treatment, there is no reason why all maximum thresholds should not be 100%, whilst retaining the current lower thresholds to provide incentives for lower performing practices.

Indexed as

Physician Incentive PlansSalaries and Fringe BenefitsContract ServicesFamily PracticeHealth Services ResearchHumansQuality Assurance, Health CareQuality Indicators, Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveSocioeconomic FactorsState MedicineUnited Kingdom

Identifiers

PMID18559086
PMCPMC2442837
OpenAlexW1995989292

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.