Evidence map›Paper›PMID 17213047›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical Internet research2006

Evaluating common de-identification heuristics for personal health information.

Khaled El Emam, Sam Jabbouri, Scott Sams, Youenn Drouet, Michael Power

Abstract readEvaluation Study
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical Internet research, 2006. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Ethical and practical challenges to studying patients who opt out of large-scale biorepository research.Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA · 2013
    Article
  9. Article
  10. SHARE: system design and case studies for statistical health information release.Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA · 2013
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Estimating the re-identification risk of clinical data sets.BMC medical informatics and decision making · 2012
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Review
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Anonymization of administrative billing codes with repeated diagnoses through censoring.AMIA ... Annual Symposium proceedings. AMIA Symposium · 2010
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Khaled El EmamCHEO Research Institute, 401 Smyth Road, Ottawa, ON K1H 8L1, Canada. kelemam@uottawa.ca
Sam Jabbouri
Scott Sams
Youenn Drouet
Michael Power

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundWith the growing adoption of electronic medical records, there are increasing demands for the use of this electronic clinical data in observational research. A frequent ethics board requirement for such secondary use of personal health information in observational research is that the data be de-identified. De-identification heuristics are provided in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule, funding agency and professional association privacy guidelines, and common practice.

objectiveThe aim of the study was to evaluate whether the re-identification risks due to record linkage are sufficiently low when following common de-identification heuristics and whether the risk is stable across sample sizes and data sets.

methodsTwo methods were followed to construct identification data sets. Re-identification attacks were simulated on these. For each data set we varied the sample size down to 30 individuals, and for each sample size evaluated the risk of re-identification for all combinations of quasi-identifiers. The combinations of quasi-identifiers that were low risk more than 50% of the time were considered stable.

resultsThe identification data sets we were able to construct were the list of all physicians and the list of all lawyers registered in Ontario, using 1% sampling fractions. The quasi-identifiers of region, gender, and year of birth were found to be low risk more than 50% of the time across both data sets. The combination of gender and region was also found to be low risk more than 50% of the time. We were not able to create an identification data set for the whole population.

conclusionsExisting Canadian federal and provincial privacy laws help explain why it is difficult to create an identification data set for the whole population. That such examples of high re-identification risk exist for mainstream professions makes a strong case for not disclosing the high-risk variables and their combinations identified here. For professional subpopulations with published membership lists, many variables often needed by researchers would have to be excluded or generalized to ensure consistently low re-identification risk. Data custodians and researchers need to consider other statistical disclosure techniques for protecting privacy.

Indexed as

Biomedical ResearchCanadaConfidentialityHumansInformation ManagementInformation Storage and RetrievalMedical Record LinkageMedical Records Systems, Computerized

Identifiers

PMID17213047
PMCPMC1794009

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.