Evidence map›Paper›PMID 17067197›Full record

ReviewPharmacoEconomics2006

Economic evaluation and decision making in the UK.

Martin J Buxton

Abstract readReview
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Review in PharmacoEconomics, 2006. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 28 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
28citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

28 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Health Risk Assessment Indicators for the Left-Behind Elderly in Rural China: A Delphi Study.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2020
    Article
  9. Understanding the global measurement of willingness to pay in health.Journal of market access & health policy · 2020
    Review
  10. Article
  11. Development of Methods for the Mapping of Utilities Using Mixture Models: Mapping the AQLQ-S to the EQ-5D-5L and the HUI3 in Patients with Asthma.Value in health : the journal of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research · 2018
    Article
  12. Article
  13. F1000Research · 2015
    Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Martin J BuxtonHealth Economics Research Group, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UK. martin.buxton@brunel.ac.uk

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This article reviews the development of economic evaluation of health technologies in the UK and its impact on decision making. After a long period of limited impact from studies mainly carried out as academic exercises, the advent of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999 provided a transparent decision-making context where economic evaluation plays a central role. This article reviews some of the key characteristics about the way NICE works, for example, the way NICE has defined the form of analysis that it requires, reflecting its objective of maximising health gain (QALYs) from the predetermined and limited UK NHS budget. Two broad areas of widespread concern are noted. The first relates to the cost-effectiveness thresholds that NICE uses and the basis for them. The second is the patchy implementation of NICE guidance and the possible reasons for this. But even within the UK, NICE is the exception in making extensive and explicit use of economic evaluation and this article goes on to suggest that if there is to be a more widespread and consistent use of economic evaluation at both central and local levels, then health economists and others need to address three issues. The first is to be clear about what is the correct conceptual basis for determining the cost-effectiveness threshold and then to ensure that NICE has the empirical evidence to set it appropriately. The second is to recognise that even using the limited view of costs adopted by NICE, economic evaluations imply temporal and cross-service budgetary flexibility that the NHS locally does not in practice enjoy. The third issue is that with academic pressures for ever-increasing sophistication of 'state of the art' economic evaluation analysis, the NHS has more and more precise understanding of the cost effectiveness of just a few new technologies and little or no analysis of most. This limits the value of the former by reducing further the scope for appropriately disinvesting from cost-ineffective technologies to meet the additional costs of investing in cost-effective new ones. Whilst NICE stands out as an example of a context where high-quality economic evaluation plays a major role in decision making, the process is far from perfect and certainly is not representative of the use made of economic evaluation by the NHS as a whole. Health economists need to engage with the public and the health service to better understand their perspectives, rather than focusing on academic concerns relating to details of theory and analytical method.

Indexed as

Decision Making, OrganizationalCost-Benefit AnalysisEconomics, PharmaceuticalGovernment AgenciesUnited Kingdom

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.