Evidence map›Paper›PMID 16424427›Full record

ReviewChest2006

Avian influenza virus infections in humans.

Samson S Y Wong, Kwok-Yung Yuen

Open access · bronzeAbstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Chest, 2006. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 118 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
118citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
26.5field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

118 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 344 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Amantadine and rimantadine for influenza A in children and the elderly.The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · 2014
    Pooled it
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58 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Samson S Y WongDepartment of Microbiology, Research Centre of Infection and Immunology, State Key Laboratory of Emerging Infectious Disease, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong.
Kwok-Yung Yuen
University of Hong Kong · HK

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Seroepidemiologic and virologic studies since 1889 suggested that human influenza pandemics were caused by H1, H2, and H3 subtypes of influenza A viruses. If not for the 1997 avian A/H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong of China, subtype H2 is the likely candidate for the next pandemic. However, unlike previous poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza due to H5 that were controlled by depopulation with or without vaccination, the presently circulating A/H5N1 genotype Z virus has since been spreading from Southern China to other parts of the world. Migratory birds and, less likely, bird trafficking are believed to be globalizing the avian influenza A/H5N1 epidemic in poultry. More than 200 human cases of avian influenza virus infection due to A/H5, A/H7, and A/H9 subtypes mainly as a result of poultry-to-human transmission have been reported with a > 50% case fatality rate for A/H5N1 infections. A mutant or reassortant virus capable of efficient human-to-human transmission could trigger another influenza pandemic. The recent isolation of this virus in extrapulmonary sites of human diseases suggests that the high fatality of this infection may be more than just the result of a cytokine storm triggered by the pulmonary disease. The emergence of resistance to adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) and recently oseltamivir while H5N1 vaccines are still at the developmental stage of phase I clinical trial are causes for grave concern. Moreover, the to-be pandemic strain may have little cross immunogenicity to the presently tested vaccine strain. The relative importance and usefulness of airborne, droplet, or contact precautions in infection control are still uncertain. Laboratory-acquired avian influenza H7N7 has been reported, and the laboratory strains of human influenza H2N2 could also be the cause of another pandemic. The control of this impending disaster requires more research in addition to national and international preparedness at various levels. The epidemiology, virology, clinical features, laboratory diagnosis, management, and hospital infection control measures are reviewed from a clinical perspective.

Indexed as

Disease OutbreaksAnimalsDisease Transmission, InfectiousGlobal HealthHumansIncidenceInfluenza A Virus, H5N1 SubtypeInfluenza A Virus, H7N7 SubtypeInfluenza, HumanInfluenza in BirdsPoultryRNA, ViralZoonosesRNA, Viral

Identifiers

PMID16424427
PMCPMC7094746
OpenAlexW2106767752

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.