Evidence map›Paper›PMID 15923470›Full record

ArticleTobacco control2005

Understanding Philip Morris's pursuit of US government regulation of tobacco.

P A McDaniel, R E Malone

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Tobacco control, 2005. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
25citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
2.1field-weighted citation impact, top 13% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

25 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 50 citations in OpenAlex.

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  20. Corporate philanthropy, lobbying, and public health policy.American journal of public health · 2008
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

P A McDanielCenter for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, 530 Parnassus Avenue, Suite 366, San Francisco, CA 94143-1390, USA. pmcdanie@itsa.ucsf.edu
R E Malone
University of California, San Francisco · USUniversity of California San Francisco Medical Center · US

Funding

Tobacco Industry Targeting of Gays and LesbiansR01CA090789 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO · PI MALONE, RUTH E · 2001 to 2004
$1.1M
Responses to Public Health CampaignsR01CA095989 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI MALONE, RUTH E · 2003 to 2006
$857k
NCI NIH HHS CA095989NCI NIH HHS CA90789NCI NIH HHS R01 CA090789NCI NIH HHS R01 CA095989
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo investigate Philip Morris's support of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco products and analyse its relationship to the company's image enhancement strategies. DATA SOURCES: Internal Philip Morris documents released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement.

methodsSearches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) beginning with such terms as "FDA" and "regulatory strategy" and expanding to include relevant new terms.

resultsPhilip Morris's support for government regulation of tobacco is part of a broader effort to address its negative public image, which has a damaging impact on the company's stock price, political influence, and employee morale. Through regulation, the company seeks to enhance its legitimacy, redefine itself as socially responsible, and alter the litigation environment. Whereas health advocates frame tobacco use as a public health policy issue, Philip Morris's regulatory efforts focus on framing tobacco use as an individual choice by informed adults to use a risky product. This framing allows Philip Morris to portray itself as a reasonable and responsible manufacturer and marketer of risky products.

conclusionsPhilip Morris's ability to improve its image through support of FDA regulation may undermine tobacco control efforts aimed at delegitimising the tobacco industry. It may also create the impression that Philip Morris's products are being made safer and ultimately protect the company from litigation. While strong regulation of tobacco products and promotion remain critical public health goals, previous experiences with tobacco regulation show that caution may be warranted.

Indexed as

Government RegulationHumansPropagandaPublic RelationsSmokingSmoking PreventionTobacco IndustryUnited StatesUnited States Food and Drug Administration

Identifiers

PMID15923470
PMCPMC1343526
OpenAlexW2119203076

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.