Evidence map›Paper›PMID 12515571›Full record

ArticlePharmacoEconomics2003

European healthcare policies for controlling drug expenditure.

Silvia M Ess, Sebastian Schneeweiss, Thomas D Szucs

Abstract read
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in PharmacoEconomics, 2003. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 66 papers, 5 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
66citing papers in PubMed, 5 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

66 citing papers in PubMed, 5 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers.The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · 2015
    Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Pooled it
  4. Pooled it
  5. Pooled it
  6. Trial
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article

6 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Silvia M EssHirslanden Research, Zurich, Switzerland.
Sebastian Schneeweiss
Thomas D Szucs

Funding

CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG COST SHARING IN THE ELDERLYR01HS010881 · AHRQ · BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL · PI SCHNEEWEISS, SEBASTIAN G. · 2000 to 2006
$263k
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIAL COST SHARING IN THE ELDERLYR03HS009855 · AHRQ · HARVARD UNIVERSITY (MEDICAL SCHOOL) · PI SOUMERAI, STEPHEN B · 1999 to 1999
–
AHRQ HHS HS09855AHRQ HHS HS10881
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In the last 20 years, expenditures on pharmaceuticals - as well as total health expenditures - have grown faster than the gross national product in all European countries. The aim of this paper was to review policies that European governments apply to reduce or at least slow down public expenditure on pharmaceutical products. Such policies can target the industry, the wholesalers and retailers, prescribers, and patients. The objectives of pharmaceutical policies are multidimensional and must take into account issues relating to public health, public expenditure and industrial incentives. Both price levels and consumption patterns determine the level of total drug expenditure in a particular country, and both factors vary greatly across countries. Licensing and pricing policies intend to influence the supply side. Three types of pricing policies can be recognised: product price control, reference pricing and profit control. Profit control is mainly used in the UK. Reference pricing systems were first used in Germany and The Netherlands and are being considered in other countries. Product price control is still the most common method for establishing the price of drugs. For the aim of fiscal consolidation, price-freeze and price-cut measures have been frequently used in the 1980s and 1990s. They have affected all types of schemes. For drug wholesalers and retailers, most governments have defined profit margins. The differences in price levels as well as the introduction of a Single European Pharmaceutical Market has led to the phenomenon of parallel imports among member countries of the European Union. This may be facilitated by larger and more powerful wholesalers and the vertical integration between wholesalers and retailers. To control costs, the use of generic drugs is encouraged in most countries, but only few countries allow pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for proprietary brands. Various interventions are used to reduce the patients' demand for drugs by either denying or limiting reimbursement of products and providing an incentive for patients to reduce their consumption of drugs. These interventions include defining a list either of drugs reimbursed (positive list) or one of drugs not reimbursed (negative list), and patient co-payments, which require patients to pay a proportion of the cost of a prescribed product or a fixed charge. Policies intended to affect physicians' prescribing behaviour include guidelines, information (about price and less expensive alternatives) and feedback, and the use of budgetary restrictions.

Indexed as

Cost ControlCost SharingDrug and Narcotic ControlDrug CostsDrug IndustryDrugs, GenericDrug Utilization ReviewEconomics, PharmaceuticalEuropeFemaleFormularies as TopicGuidelines as TopicHealth ExpendituresHealth PolicyHumansDrugs, Generic

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.