ArticlePharmacoEconomics1999
Pharmaceutical price regulation. A study on the impact of the rate-of-return regulation in the UK.
Article in PharmacoEconomics, 1999. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.
- International experience in controlling pharmaceutical expenditure: influencing patients and providers and regulating industry - a systematic review.Journal of health services research & policy · 2015Pooled it
- Pharmaceutical policies: effects of reference pricing, other pricing, and purchasing policies.The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · 2014Pooled it
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
objectiveThis work carries out an empirical evaluation of the impact of the main mechanism for regulating the prices of medicines in the UK [the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS)] on a variety of pharmaceutical price indices. The article also discusses to what extent the rate-of-return (ROR) regulation has encouraged UK-based pharmaceutical firms with patented products to diversify into markets in which products face strong competition. DESIGN AND
settingThe article starts with some background on the PPRS and the way firms behave under ROR constraints. The article goes on to explain the cointegration methods used and the results obtained. Finally, it offers some discussion and some conclusions related to the evidence and the incentives of UK pharmaceutical firms under the PPRS constraint. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES AND
resultsThe results obtained show that, according to only some cointegration tests carried out, the aggregate price indices of medical preparations and the price index of some therapeutic areas are cointegrated with the time series of ROR caps between 1980 and 1994. Additionally, a 1% change in the ROR cap has produced only a 0.15% change on the aggregate medicine price index.
conclusionsThese results suggest that changes in the ROR cap have had little or no impact on medicine prices and that, at best, the impact of the ROR has also differed significantly across major therapeutic areas. Finally, it is argues that the UK regulation of prices might have encouraged firms to diversify into competitive medicine-regulated markets and into uncontrolled markets.
Indexed as
Identifiers
10537436What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.